'The unmasking of modern science' – the sequel (II) by van der Walt, J.L.
 Koers 71(2, 3, 4) 2006:423-442  423 
“The unmasking of modern science” –  
the sequel (II) 1
J.L. (Hannes) van der Walt 
Faculty of Education Sciences 
North-West University 
Potchefstroom Campus 
POTCHEFSTROOM 
E-mail: jlvdwalt@intekom.co.za
Abstract 
“The unmasking of modern science” – the sequel (II) 
In 1982, T.M. Moore claimed that positivism was in the process 
of being “unmasked”. Its shortcomings were being unmasked 
by its enemies as well as by its adherents. In describing the 
process of unmasking, Moore resorted to T.S. Kuhn’s socio-
logical theory of normal science, paradigms, crises and 
revolutions. Moore then went on to challenge the Christian 
scholarly community to (inter alia) develop a new paradigm for 
science. Now, after just more than two decades have elapsed 
since this exhortation by Moore, a survey had to be done to see 
to what extent the secular as well as the Christian community 
has taken up the challenge and how both of them have 
progressed in the directions that Moore had predicted. It has 
also become time for the Christian community to assess its own 
progress towards developing a “new” scientific paradigm. In 
this, the second part of a two-part article on this subject, the 
author attends not only to how the Christian community took up 
Moore’s challenges, but also to how Christian scholars tried to 
avoid the pitfalls of secularism, postmodern fragmentation and 
a preference for contingent foundations, which have become 
the characteristic features of modern science, as outlined in 
part I of this article. 
                                      
1 The input and advice of Prof. Pieter G.W. du Plessis and three anonymous 
referees in the writing of this article are hereby gratefully acknowledged. 
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Opsomming 
“The unmasking of modern science” – die vervolg (II) 
In 1982 het T.M. Moore die stelling gewaag dat die positivisme 
in ’n proses van “ontmaskering” vasgevang was. Die tekort-
kominge daarvan is destyds blootgelê deur sowel die vyande as 
die aanhangers daarvan. In sy pogings om die ontmaskering te 
beskryf het Moore gebruik gemaak van T.S. Kuhn se sosio-
logiese teorie van normale wetenskap, paradigmas, krisisse en 
revolusie. Moore het sy uiteensetting beëindig met ’n uitdaging 
aan die Christelike wetenskapsgemeenskap om na vore te kom 
met ’n eie nuwe paradigma vir wetenskapsbeoefening. Nou, 
nadat net meer as twee dekades verloop het sedert Moore 
hierdie oproep gedoen het, het die tyd aangebreek om ’n 
opname te maak van hoe die sekulêre sowel as die Christelike 
wetenskap gevorder het op die pad wat Moore voorspel het. So 
’n oorsig bied ook aan die Christelike wetenskapsgemeenskap 
die geleentheid om bestek op te neem oor die ontwikkeling van 
’n eie nuwe paradigma van wetenskapsbeoefening. In hierdie, 
die tweede deel van ’n tweedelige artikel oor die onderwerp, 
skenk die outeur aandag aan hoe die Christelike wetenskaps-
gemeenskap die drie uitdagings van Moore die hoof gebied het, 
en ook hoe dit probeer om die gevare van sekularisme, 
postmoderne fragmentering en ’n voorkeur vir kontingente 
grondslae – wat volgens deel I van hierdie artikel kenmerkend 
van moderne wetenskapsbeoefening geword het – te vermy. 
1. Introductory remarks 
In the first part of this article, reference was made to a publication by 
T.M. Moore (1982) in which he surveyed developments in the field of 
the philosophy and sociology of science, and also called on 
Christian scholars to apply their energies and efforts to three tasks: 
• In the first place, there must be a continuing effort to expose the 
fallacies and inconsistencies of the secular and evolutionary 
approach to science. 
• Second, there must begin a widespread yet highly organised 
effort to construct a comprehensive paradigm for scientific activity 
based upon the Biblical worldview. 
• Finally, there must be a sustained and concerted evangelistic 
effort into the lost world, including among secular scientists. A 
Biblical view of science, he said, would only make sense to those 
who had learned to trust in Jesus Christ and had received the gift 
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of eternal life and the new perspective it provided (Moore, 
1982:85-86). 
Developments relating to the first of these three tasks were traced in 
the first part of this article. The other two tasks will now be attended 
to in this second part of the article. This second part also contains 
conclusions with respect to all three tasks that Moore set to the 
Christian scholarly community, and thus serves as the conclusion to 
the article as a whole. In the process, reference will also be made to 
how the Christian community strove to avoid the pitfalls of modern 
science as outlined in section 6 of part I of this article, namely 
secularism, postmodern fragmentation and a preference for contin-
gent foundations.2
2. Developments in the Christian philosophy and 
sociology of science 
2.1 Introductory remarks 
Christian philosophers of science practically immediately latched 
onto Kuhn’s paradigm theory3 in Structure, in the belief that he had 
made a major contribution towards liberating science from the 
Christian scholar’s arch-enemy, positivism-empiricism-objectivism. 
Not only was it believed that it had liberated the natural sciences 
from the bondage of this foe (cf. Fuller, 2000:2), but also the social 
and human sciences – that had up to that point always striven to be 
as “objective” and “rigorously positivist” as the natural sciences. It 
also led them to reflect on the role of the life-view as the “tacit 
dimension” of scientific practice within a paradigm, as suggested by 
Michael Polanyi (1891-1976). 
Many Christian scholars accepted Kuhn’s initial notion of a paradigm 
as a broad framework within which science is conducted (Kuhn, 
1970:271-272). What initially appealed to them was the fact that 
Kuhn likened the inevitable shift between paradigms to a religious 
conversion or a change in worldview, the overall effect of which 
produces a revolution in science (cf. Fuller, 2000:2). Later insights 
                                      
2 The reader is kindly requested to first read the first part of the article, and then 
to proceed to the second. The first part contains the problem statement, the 
purpose of the article, and the method followed in putting the argument together. 
3 Note how frequently Moore himself used the term as reflected in section 1 of 
this article. Klapwijk (1987:109) also regarded historical Calvinism “as (some-
what of) a basic paradigm for our scholarly work”. 
Koers 71(2, 3, 4) 2006:423-442  425 
“The unmasking of modern science” – the sequel (II)  
into Kuhn’s views proved that he was not actually referring to 
religion or to a cosmoscope or life-view (philosophy of life) but rather 
to a scientific worldview.4
It would appear that some Christian scholars also made themselves 
guilty of using the Kuhnian narrative uncritically to legitimate their 
“Christian approach to science” as a paradigm on the same footing 
as in the natural or physical sciences (cf. Fuller, 2000:380). 
After realising that Kuhn’s view of the history of science had 
relatively limited value as an argument in favour of science from a 
Biblical perspective, Christian scholars (epistemologists; philoso-
phers and sociologists of science) began to employ the term 
paradigm rather more broadly, more in the sense of an episteme as 
referred to by Michel Foucault in his book Les mots et les choses 
(The order of things, 1966), viz. as a term describing the structure of 
thought that defines the boundaries for what can be thought and 
said in a particular social and intellectual milieu. In a sense, 
according to Horrocks and Jevtic (2004:65), Foucault attempted to 
cast Kuhn’s idea of a paradigm into a new form. An episteme is 
understood to be a time and culturally constrained and determined 
discourse framework. It is the underlying framework that allows 
thinking to order itself. It limits the totality of experience, knowledge 
and truth, and determines the nature of science in a particular time-
frame. According to Blake (1996:219), an episteme  
can be thought of as the structured collection of our deepest 
and least readily questioned philosophical assumptions: those 
which exist for us less as articulated and considered 
propositions than as unnoticed but constraining and 
determining cultural framework for our supposedly deepest 
thinking. Its contingency, the possibility of adopting a different 
framework, is thus not readily exposed to critique.  
Foucault (1996) uses several other terms to explain the idea of an 
episteme: interpretive diagram (p. 101), a regime of practices 
(p. 103), a polyhedron of intelligibility (p. 105), theoretical scheme 
                                      
4 Cf. Botha (1990:36) for a detailed discussion of the difference between a 
person’s view of reality and life (his or her cosmoscope), and his or her scientific 
view or image of life and the world. The latter consists of, inter alia, metaphors, 
paradigms and models. Some philosophers use the term thought image when 
referring to the scientific view or image of the world. Strauss (2001: 90, 91) 
refers to the role of “theoretical frames of reference” or “theoretical 
(philosophical) paradigms” – both those of individuals and of a community of 
scholars. 
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(p. 105), a structure of understanding (p. 108), rational scheme 
(p. 109), to mention a few. Christian scholars tend to see their work 
contextualised by such a broad framework.5 According to Foucault 
(1996:109), Calvinism, like other epistemes, work with “general 
principles that are not all present in the thoughts of the individuals 
whose concrete behavior is nevertheless to be understood on their 
basis”. 
Analysis of current Christian or Biblically-founded approaches to 
science shows, however, that most of the adherents to this 
approach refrain from presenting arguments in terms of an explicit 
paradigm, episteme, system or school. Although they seem to be 
aware of the meaning and impact of terms such as paradigm, 
normal science, revolution, crisis and paradigm shift, they prefer not 
to couch their ideas in these terms.  
Although most Christian scholars today are well informed about 
Kuhn’s and Foucault’s ideas and the discourse surrounding their 
contributions to the philosophy and sociology of science, they seem 
to have left all of that behind them,6 and tend to concentrate on 
solving problems and discussing subjects from the vantage point of 
a Biblically based frame of reference for thinking and discourse. In 
the process, traces of the impact of large-scale philosophical 
systems, for example of the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea, 
can still be detected in their thinking (e.g. references to the structural 
dimensions and the modal functions of reality that surface relatively 
frequently in their writings).7
                                      
5  Although they would prefer to describe the context as their religious, faith and 
life-view frame of reference. In a sense, root metaphors as construed and 
employed by Botha (1990:37; 2004) are reminiscent of epistemes as described 
here: “A root metaphor is something like a world hypothesis, a broad type of 
metaphor. Root metaphors are those sets of assumptions, usually implicit, about 
what sorts of things make up the world, how they act, how they hang together 
and, usually by implication, how they may be known. As such root metaphors 
constitute the ultimate presuppositions or frame of reference for discourse on 
the world or any domain within it”. 
6  They discovered, as Klapwijk (1987:102) succinctly said, that advancing the 
thesis that science (including philosophy) proceeds from worldview principles or 
from a personal commitment was “no more than kicking in the already open 
door” of secular science. 
7  Examples of this can be found, for instance, in Van Woudenberg (1992 and 
1996), Van der Hoeven (1995) and Strauss (2001). 
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One of the problems that intrigued Christian philosophers (of 
science) was: How can we take cognisance of developments in 
secular science, and how can/should we avail ourselves of the 
valuable insights emerging from those approaches? Their interest in 
this problem was stimulated by the fact that recent developments in 
the secular world, such as secularism, postmodernism and the 
concomitant magpie and constructivist approaches to science, 
materialism-naturalism, and creative anti-realism unavoidably im-
pacted on their own work as scholars. They realised that it was 
inevitable that their own thought, spiritual life, and their responses to 
the world and to God would be influenced, coloured and perhaps 
corrupted by these ways of thinking. To the extent that this was the 
case, their intellectual and spiritual lives would be characterised by a 
lack of integrality, of wholeness, of being all of one piece, says 
Plantinga (1995:42-43). They would be pulled in different directions, 
would be inclined to take for granted, unthinkingly assume, ways of 
thought and ways of looking at the world that did not fit well with the 
Christian faith to which they were committed. It was therefore of the 
greatest importance that Christian scholars engage in philosophical 
and cultural – including scientific – criticism. Plantinga (1995:53) is 
convinced, however, that if the Christian scholar  
does things right, she will not automatically accept current 
popular accounts; she will offer one of her own, one that arises 
naturally out of her Christian way of thinking about the world 
... Her account will of course be designed to fit and illuminate 
the kinds of knowledge we all have in common: perception, 
memory, reason, and the like; she is thus in the world. But it will 
also be designed and perhaps specially designed to fit and 
illuminate kinds of knowledge her unbelieving compatriot will 
dismiss: our knowledge of God, of the great truths of the 
Gospel, and of how to appropriate the latter for our own lives; 
she is thus not of this world. 
2.2 The stewardship approach to knowledge in a nutshell8  
As indicated in sections 1 and 2 of the first article, Moore envisaged 
Christian scholars involving themselves in a process of further 
developing and expounding such a Christian view of science and 
scholarship, i.e. a view based on a Biblical life-view or cosmology. 
                                      
8 The roots of the stewardship approach can be traced back to, inter alia, 
Dooyeweerd’s theory of transcendental criticism and Vollenhoven’s thetical-
critical method.  
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One can today state that the community of Christian scholars indeed 
has been taking up this challenge. An important development in this 
context was the emergence of “stewardship epistemology”.9 This 
epistemology is based on what Klapwijk (1987:105) called “a distinc-
tively Christian, or more specifically, reformational position”.  
The stewardship approach has at its core a fiducial constant, which 
is described by Fowler (2004:58) as follows:  
A fiducial constant refers to a reliable object worthy of our trust. 
All human life, in the end, operates on the basis of such trust in 
what we regard as a worthy object of trust. ... The Christian is 
called to live the whole of life guided by a belief in God in Christ 
as the fiducial constant, the one worthy of all our trust. We also 
have a sound reason for this trust. It is founded in the 
experience of God’s revelation of himself, in all creation, in 
Scripture and, above all, in the person of Jesus Christ. 
Klapwijk (1987:105) describes this position further as follows: “Our 
own position, although we stumble, is in Christ ...” Plantinga 
(1995:46) agrees with him in saying that Christian scholars want to 
know and understand themselves and the world. However, their way 
of understanding will be inevitably different from that of those who 
do not share their basic commitment to the Lord. The Christian 
scholar also possesses other kinds of knowledge that others rarely 
think about, such as knowledge of God, knowledge of the truths of 
the gospel, knowledge of how they can have access to their only 
comfort in life and in death, and knowledge of how they can achieve 
                                      
9 Stewardship education is, for instance, rooted in stewardship epistemology, as 
expounded inter alia by H. Dooyeweerd, D.H.Th. Vollenhoven and H.G.Stoker, 
to mention only a few. For discussions of aspects of stewardship education, 
following in the footsteps of, for instance, J. Waterink, J. Chr. Coetzee and A.H. de 
Graaf, cf. the following (to mention only a few): Fowler (1987); Van Brummelen 
(1988); Fowler, Van Brummelen & Van Dyk (1990); Fowler (1991); Edlin (1994); 
Marsden (1997); Van Dyk (1997) and Van Dyk (2000). The point of stewardship 
education, says Blomberg (1992:191), is to respect the religious responsibility of 
the child as an individual made in the image of God, so that he/she may begin to 
exercise their dominion in unfolding the creation in service of others. (Similar 
lists of contributions to the fields of technology, sociology, economy and other 
disciplines can be compiled.)  
A detailed discussion of developments in reformational philosophy and 
epistemology, in particular, goes beyond the scope of this article. Klapwijk 
(1987) presents a fairly detailed discussion of developments in this context for 
the period from the 1930s to the mid-1980s. He describes the developments in 
terms of seven themes. The stewardship approach can arguably be regarded as 
yet another theme. 
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their chief end of glorifying God and enjoying him for ever 
(Plantinga, 1995:48-49). Faith is also another kind of knowledge10 
(Plantinga, 1995:51). 
The central thesis of stewardship epistemology is that man, the 
knowing subject, is placed in the world to rule over it for God as his 
steward. Such dominion, says Blomberg (1992:186), presumes 
knowledge, understanding, wisdom, both of God’s will for his 
creatures and of the creatures that are subject to him. Man should 
take cognisance of the structure of created reality and the divine 
norms given for and in creation, and should respond faithfully to 
them. The way we respond to the things that we experience around 
us will differ from situation to situation, not by the steward’s arbitrary 
choice, but because God has set a law for all creaturely functioning. 
Knowledge is knowledge of a law-ordered world, including of the 
leading functions of the things that we encounter. In such subject-
object encounters there is an opening or disclosing of meaning. 
Although the experience that all people have is the same, because 
all of them live as creatures in God’s world, their response to their 
experiences (their knowledge) will differ according to their religious 
commitment. Our response in each situation is part of our 
responsibility to God (Blomberg, 1992:187-189). In the context of the 
stewardship approach, 
... all knowing necessarily involves obedience to the Word of 
God. Knowledge is not a matter of (cognitive) facts plus 
(attitudinal) values. All knowledge involves analytical distinc-
tions but no more than it involves commitment to obedient 
action: we can only really speak of ‘knowledge’ when an 
integral subjection to the norms of human acting is involved 
(Blomberg, 1992:189). 
As far as the knowable is concerned, every creature and every 
event says to man: “I am responding in my own God-ordained 
creaturely way to the Word of God. Treat me in accord with that 
Word!” The responsibility of the knower, then, is to lead each 
creature and guide each event to more fully display (respond to) its 
potential to glorify God. All the actions of the knower should be 
                                      
10 According to the reformational view, all these faculties or powers that human 
beings have been endowed with by their Creator were corrupted by the fall into 
sin, and therefore by sinful human nature. Fortunately, “the Lord took dramatic 
action to enable us to be reborn, regenerated, to regain our lost relationship with 
him, to live once more the way he intended us to” (Plantinga, 1995:49-50). 
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obedient responses to the Word of God, and not a wilful satisfaction 
of his or her own desires (Blomberg, 1992:191-192). 
Christians who align themselves with the stewardship approach 
resist the Enlightenment view in terms of which universal reason is 
seen to reign supreme – also in the domains of science and 
scholarship. They do not accept the rationalist assumption that there 
is a universal and generally applicable set of criteria in terms of 
which the knower can determine the truth or justification of 
knowledge or science. They also do not believe in the power of 
human rationality to provide a universal structure of certainty for 
human life (Fowler, 2004:43). They see reason as only one of many 
modal functions with which human beings have been equipped by 
God, as the instrument by means of which they can grasp the law-
subjected patterns in creation. They also maintain that the process 
of knowing is always somehow determined by transcendental 
conditions,11 in other words conditions of possibility, such as the 
knower’s religious orientation or commitment, his or her life-view, 
personal faith, theoretical and pre-theoretical assumptions and 
convictions.  
There are three factors involved in the human knowing activity: the 
knower, the knowable, and the law-like structures that govern both 
the knower and the knowable in the knowing situation. There can be 
no knowing without these law-like structures, the ordering principle, 
governing both the knower, the act of knowing and the knowable in 
the knowing situation. There is some kind of law that ensures that 
our world (reality) is the kind of world it is and not another kind. (This 
is the essence of the Christian scholar’s cosmological-structural a 
priori.) In relation to the knowing activity, this law must govern both 
knower and the knowable in the knowing situation (Van der Walt & 
Fowler, 2006:33-46).  
Christian scholars take a “common sense” understanding of how the 
human mind works as their point of departure: the human mind 
works with sense data and processes this data. Thoughts, 
(conceptual) schemes, thought-events, words, utterances, cognisers 
and reactors should be seen as possible facets of mind 
                                      
11 Transcendental in this context means underlying or basic, a condition of 
possibility. It should not be confused with Kant’s idea that the rationality of the 
human individual is universally equipped with an inbuilt structure for ordering 
human experience in order to construct a systematic knowledge with universal 
validity (Fowler, 2004:51). 
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constructions. Human beings possess different methods of mapping 
an independently identifiable reality. They arrange beliefs and sense 
data, desires, the utterances of others, into an as maximally 
coherent bundle as they can get. Human beings have been created 
with different basic cognitive faculties or noetic abilities: perception, 
memory, intuition, moral knowledge/sensibility/intuition, reason (the 
faculty of a priori knowledge and belief), the ability to reason, of 
introspection, sympathy (whereby one can understand the thoughts 
and feelings of others), induction (whereby one can learn from 
experience), credulity (the ability to believe evidence presented by 
others), an attitude of belief in the ordered structure of reality, an 
attitude of trust in God12 and his order-giving Word, of submission to 
God, the ability to have both head-knowledge and action-knowledge 
(Blomberg, 1992:185; Plantinga, 1995:48; Van Woudenberg, 
1995:291). Human beings have these faculties or powers or 
cognitive processes by virtue of creation, and it is by virtue of their 
operation that they form beliefs and acquire knowledge (Plantinga, 
1995:49). 
Creation and creation order are not social constructions of our own 
minds, but a gift. And with every gift, say Middleton and Walsh 
(1995:163), there is also a task; it comes with a call. The human 
being is, therefore, essentially homo respondens. “While an order is 
quite literally given to life, we are also called to give order to life. 
Such an ordering of life is constitutive to human culture-forming”. 
Middleton and Walsh (1995:163) also call for a common sense, 
balanced approach: 
If scholars only noticed the given, indeed gift, character of 
creation’s order, thereby ignoring our ordering role in the world, 
then they will likely succumb to the temptation of an 
authoritarian and absolutistic realism. They will identify their 
own worldview and cultural praxis so closely with the given 
order of the world that they will be closed to all other 
perspectives. The result will be precisely the self-protective, 
myopic and aggressive worldview that postmodern authors 
perceive in modernity. If, however, they only attended to the 
reality-constructing activity of ordering their own world, then 
regardless of how much they want to avoid totalizing violence, 
their efforts will lack creational integrity and direction. 
                                      
12 The sensus divinitatis: the ability through which one can know God. 
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2.3 Different emphases 
All Christian scholars, including the author of this article,13 broadly 
share the stewardship approach to knowledge construction and 
science/scholarship. A trawl of the literature shows, however, that 
each of them tends to each emphasise different aspects of that 
approach. To illustrate this, compare the following random 
examples:14  
• Following the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea, Schuurman 
(1994:94, 149-151) emphasises the role played by the religious 
ground motive of creation, fall into sin and redemption. He also 
stresses responsibility, love, righteousness, justice, service, mer-
cy, thankfulness and a readiness to make sacrifices, the role of 
norms, creational order, the full armour of faith and recreation in 
Christ as part of how he approaches stewardship philosophy (i.c. 
of technology).  
• Others, like Monsma (1998), see stewardship as only one 
important aspect of their approach, together with wealth, sin, 
redemption, faith and the social aspect of humanity.  
• Venter (2000:19-20), in turn, emphasises the aspect of care 
(caritas). According to him, caritas is the expression of a 
relationship with something that one holds dear. Caritas pertains 
directly to stewardship: to take care of that which has been 
entrusted to you. Love in the sense of caritas entails accepting 
personal co-responsibility, “sharing in caring”. It embraces the 
whole of the human being, and lends integrity to the availability of 
one’s gifts. In the context of science, caritas means accepting 
responsibility with and for all others involved, including creation 
itself and all co-workers.  
• In her research, Botha (2004:499, 521) tends to focus on how 
root metaphors relate to the Christian scholar’s quest, and how 
                                      
13 Cf. the following recent publication: De Muynck and Van der Walt, eds. 2006. 
Together with Stuart Fowler, Van der Walt was responsible for the first chapter 
of this book, entitled Constructivist teaching-learning theory: a stewardship 
approach. Section 1.5 of this book gives a succinct outline of a stewardship 
approach. 
14 The purpose here is to show how different Christian scholars emphasise 
different aspects of the stewardship approach. Detailed discussions of the 
different positions held by scholars are beyond the purpose and scope of this 
article. 
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choices for hermeneutical keys to Scripture relate to metaphorical 
keys chosen as means of access to reality. Metaphors, she 
found, make and remake the world by classifying and 
categorising it in certain ways. 
• In an article on how to approach the natural sciences, Strauss 
(2001:90-93) emphasises the need to penetrate to the ultimate 
core commitment to an underlying and directing religious 
orientation. It is important to make an appeal to the convictions 
and suppositions which influence theory construction, and to 
distinguish these from the underlying philosophical and world- 
and lifeview attitude. In his opinion, basic philosophical issues 
determine the foundational way that goes on in the natural 
sciences. A person who wants to account for them theoretically 
does so under the influence of basic (ultimate) commitments. In 
his discussion, he also highlights the roles played by the life- and 
worldview and our understanding of the law-order given for 
creation. 
• Critical realism is a stewardship approach in which its adherents 
try to maintain the Scriptures in the very highest place in shaping 
their thinking and living. It declares that “all of life is lived out by 
human beings either in obedience or disobedience to God’s laws” 
(Edlin, s.a.). Critical realists strive to see reality as it really is, in 
all its fallenness (Edlin, 1999:205). This idolatrous culture is then 
critiqued from a Biblical perspective (Edlin, 2004:13). The distinct 
feature of critical realism, according to Erickson (2001:263), is its 
interest in perceptual processes. Erickson (2001:264), a self-
declared critical realist, summarises his position as follows: 
“... while we have no absolute way of establishing the existence 
of objects external to ourselves, or of being certain that our ideas 
of those objects correspond exactly to them, we can find ways of 
cross-checking our understanding, in such a way that we can 
communicate with one another. We may need to qualify that 
further, by terming it ‘perspectival critical realism’. That means 
that although we may view reality from different perspectives, 
there is a common reality there to which we are relating and of 
which we are speaking.” 
Examples like these abound. The point is that although Christian 
scholars tend to emphasise different key aspects in their respective 
approaches (epistemology, methodology), they all somehow adhere 
to the basic notion of stewardship scholarship. Whereas Schuurman 
(1994:94), for instance, merely mentions the importance of love in 
passing, Venter (2000) employs love (caritas) as a key concept in 
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his vision for universities. Van der Hoeven (1995:61) also recog-
nises the importance of love; however, he does not use it as a key 
concept, but rather to qualify the process of touching one’s fellow 
philosophers/scholars while struggling with them about the validity of 
knowledge. In essence, however, all three of them use the same 
over-arching stewardship approach. This can probably be said of 
most Christian scholars plying their trade at the end of the previous 
century, and now in the first decade of the 21st. 
2.4 Still an unarrested social movement? 
The way the stewardship approach to science and scholarship is 
slowly but surely taking shape arguably gives support to Fuller’s 
(2000:402) contention that “Kuhn be turned on his head” by arguing 
that “a paradigm is nothing more than an arrested social movement”. 
The stewardship approach to science is still clearly in the 
“movement phase”; it has not yet been “arrested”, i.e. forced to 
become a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense. At this point in time, the 
stewardship approach can still be regarded as a “flexible organised 
cognitive praxis” that produces knowledge for enabling and disabling 
certain transformations in social life. Successful movements manage 
to retain their dynamism and flexibility, their distinctive form of 
consciousness, as they gain credibility in the course of achieving 
concrete goals. The stewardship approach, based on Fuller’s thesis, 
has clearly not yet evolved into a paradigm (cf. Fuller, 2000:403). 
According to Plantinga (1995:47), to be in transition should indeed 
be a perennial feature of Christian scholarship. The city of God, and 
the citizens therein, he says, are never completely formed and 
developed.15
3. Conclusions 
The discussion in this two-part article began with reference to the 
three-fold challenge of Moore (1982) to the community of Christian 
scholars. In view of the discussion of recent events in the spheres of 
epistemology and philosophy/sociology of science, it can be con-
                                      
15 In his opinion, the same applies for the city of the world to which the city of God 
(Augustine) stands opposed. The city of the world as well as its citizens is also 
not completely formed and developed, which explains why they keep on 
searching for the “final paradigm”. In Plantinga’s opinion, they have no place for 
the notion of truth that is intimately connected with God (Plantinga, 1995:48), 
which is why they are doomed to keep on searching for it. 
Koers 71(2, 3, 4) 2006:423-442  435 
“The unmasking of modern science” – the sequel (II)  
cluded as follows with respect to each of the three challenges put 
forward by Moore: 
• To continue to expose the fallacies and inconsistencies of the 
secular and evolutionary approach to science. 
Christian scholars have responded in several ways to the recent 
developments in the secular approach to science. On the one hand, 
they tend to unmask the fallacies and the inconsistencies in the 
secular approach, while on the other hand they realise that the so-
called secular approach is a depiction of the world in which they live 
and work as scholars themselves. They study and apply 
developments in secular philosophy and sociology of science, such 
as the paradigm theory of Kuhn and the episteme theory of 
Foucault, but once they realise the inadequacy of such theories and 
philosophical/epistemological positions, they relinquish them in 
favour of developing their own. They take cognisance of new 
frameworks on offer and of new directions that are being set in the 
secular world. As Fowler (2004:55) recently remarked, it would be 
foolish to dismiss them outright as visions of despair and 
hopelessness, without any power to give a sense of meaning and 
purpose to human life. As a consequence of this line of thinking, 
Fowler formulates a new challenge to Christian scholars, a 
challenge that updates Moore’s of more than two decades ago: “The 
challenge for Christian scholars, where we find these alternatives 
lacking, is to offer a coherent alternative of our own that is not based 
on a return to the discredited certainties of modernity but meets the 
challenges of today’s postmodern world.” He proposes a method for 
doing so: 
My proposal is that we should mount (the) necessary resistance 
to the idolatrous forces governing today’s postmodern world by 
taking the path of critical participation. On the one hand, we 
should recognise and embrace the realities of the postmodern 
world as full participants in that world. It is the world into which 
our Lord has sent us and which we are to embrace in love as 
he embraced the world into which he came. On the other hand, 
we should be critical participants offering constructive alter-
natives for remedying the fundamental flaws in our world. 
Pointing out the weaknesses is not enough; we must offer 
realistic ways of strengthening those weaknesses (Fowler, 
2004:57). 
By suggesting the use of this method, Fowler echoes a suggestion 
made a few years previously by Geertsema (1989:89/3) that 
Christian scholars should engage in a critical and constructive 
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conversation with secular scholars. In the latter’s opinion, Christian 
scholars used to concentrate too much on critical judgement of 
various ideas and systems in the fields of theology, philosophy, 
politics and the different scientific disciplines. The time had come, he 
felt, for constructive engagement about the questions that surface in 
the different disciplines. Fowler’s advice is also in line with Klapwijk’s 
(1995:175 ff.) method of transformational philosophy or criticism,16 a 
way of critically appropriating ideas and notions from secular 
philosophy and science after having purified them on the basis of 
the fiduciary constant of Christian scholarship. In Klapwijk’s (1987: 
104) opinion, the time of either separation with or accommodation of 
the secular world has gone, which implies that Christian scholars 
have to engage with the world in terms of the transformational 
method. 
• To begin a widespread yet highly organised effort to construct a 
comprehensive paradigm for scientific activity based upon the 
Biblical worldview. 
This discussion has shown that the community of Christian scholars 
has indeed made progress towards developing a comprehensive 
approach to scientific activity based on a Biblical worldview, viz. the 
stewardship approach, of which the fiducial constant is the belief in 
the God who has revealed himself in the Bible.17 The stewardship 
approach is, however, still an unarrested social movement, a work in 
progress – in other words, not yet a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense 
of the word. In Fowler’s (2004:59) opinion, it is the alternative that 
Christian scholars must offer to the world. Its fiduciary foundation 
should not be seen as merely an added dimension of life, but as the 
secure foundation on which all human endeavour must be built if the 
                                      
16 Also cf. Klapwijk (1987:103 ff.) for a brief discussion of this method in the 
context of religious antithesis. His definition of transformational philosophy is as 
follows: “The idea of transformational philosophy is based on the notions of 
assessment, arrest, and appropriation. Transformation is critical assessment, 
selection, and appropriation of existing intellectual goods in such a way that 
their incorporation into a Christian worldview means a restructuring and 
redirecting of their content, a redefining of their scope of meaning” (Klapwijk, 
1987:105). It is, of course, important to keep in mind that this method should be 
used in conjunction with other methods of reformational philosophy, such as 
transcendental criticism, what Klapwijk (1987:124) called transcendental 
hermeneutical reflection, and Vollenhoven’s problem-historical method. 
17 Fides, to accept a proposition as true, is presupposed by fiducia, trust (Van 
Woudenberg, 1995:295-296). 
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people of the world are to achieve the fullness of human life that 
everyone desires.  
• To continue a sustained and concerted evangelistic effort into the 
lost world, including among secular scientists. A Biblical view of 
science, Moore (1982:85-86) said, would only make sense to 
those who had learned to trust in Jesus Christ and had received 
the gift of eternal life and the new perspective it provided. 
It has to be made clear to the secular community of scholars, as part 
of this “evangelistic effort18 into the lost world”, that since the 
collapse of modernity’s rational certainties, this merely disguised 
under secular language the religious roots of secularised science. 
The trust in autonomous rationality as the fiducial constant of 
secularised science was itself a commitment of faith of the same 
kind as a religious commitment (Fowler, 2004:59). The discussion in 
this article supports Fowler’s (2004:59) conclusion that in the 
present postmodern world, Christian scholars do not need to argue 
the case for recognising that human rationality cannot provide a 
secure foundation for human life, since it can only function on the 
basis of trust as fiducial constant. A wide range of secular thinkers 
has already made this case very clearly.  
In declaring that all our endeavours are founded in trust in the 
God who reveals himself as the fiducial foundation for our 
rationality we are in tune with the prevailing intellectual climate. 
What we do need to do is to challenge others to similarly 
recognise and articulate the fiducial constant on which their 
rational endeavours are founded (Fowler, 2004:59). 
These three conclusions based on Moore’s challenges also cast 
light on the preliminary conclusion that was drawn towards the end 
of part I of this two-part article (section 6), namely that modern 
                                      
18 Klapwijk (1987:104) comments as follows with respect to this evangelistic drive: 
“The situation in which we find ourselves today as Christian scholars is really a 
missionary situation. It resembles that of the first Christians who had to carry the 
biblical message into an overwhelmingly apostate culture. It resembles too the 
situation one finds today in many mission fields.” While Plantinga (1995:37) 
feels that negative apologetics might be necessary in certain circumstances, i.e. 
the attempt to defend Christian belief against various sorts of attacks that are 
brought against it, the need of positive apologetics cannot be denied in some 
situations, that is to offer theistic arguments. According to Van Woudenberg 
(1995:294) such arguments are superfluous: the belief in God is “properly 
basic”, in other words, a Christian can believe in God without being able to offer 
arguments or reasons to justify this belief. Belief in God rises spontaneously in 
the heart of the believer. 
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science seems to be hampered by secularism, postmodern 
fragmentation and a preference for contingent foundations.  
• Scholars who adhere to a stewardship approach to science and 
scholarship reject the private-public dualism inherent in 
secularism. According to a Christian life-view, man is the steward 
of every inch of God’s creation. Based on the integrality, 
radicality, wholeness and creational integrity of a Christian life-
view, there can be no public part of creation where the 
sovereignty of God should or may not be proclaimed.  
• For the same reasons, the stewardship approach to science and 
scholarship also strives to avoid the postmodern fragmentation 
that currently haunts secular science. The stewardship approach 
does not see itself as particularly true or advantaged in itself, but 
rather takes every concrete historical situation it is confronted 
with, including its intellectual and life-view heritage, as its 
hermeneutical starting point. It then strives purposefully for a 
general, integral, radical, balanced and all-embracing philo-
sophical view of reality, but seeks to attain this primarily through a 
mastering of the philosophical problems as they come up in local 
situations, and secondarily in cross-cultural communication. It 
then uses what Klapwijk (1987:130) called the creational-
messianic perspective as its transformational guideline. This 
approach means that reformational thinking should be open to a 
diversity of local theories, or at least theories of which the local 
situation and background are recognisable. In this manner, 
Christian scholars become critical participants in the postmodern 
world in which they live. 
• Scholars who align themselves with the stewardship approach 
share with their postmodern colleagues the tendency to reject 
classical foundationalism such as represented by Descartes. As 
Erickson (2001:260) correctly points out, the stewardship 
approach to science and scholarship involves a foundationalism 
of a more modest sort. The stewardship approach finds its 
foundation in the Word of God, but based on a particular 
scholar’s understanding of the will of God, as expressed in his 
Word, he or she formulates certain basic propositions in terms of 
which other propositions can be justified. This type of 
foundationalism is not the absolute type found in classical 
foundationalism. It is rather a fallibilist form of foundationalism in 
the sense that it recognises the possibility of error and 
misinterpretation and of being affected by the conditioning that 
postmodernists have described.  
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General conclusion 
The Christian community has since the publication of Moore’s The 
unmasking of modern science in 1982 indeed taken up Moore’s 
three-fold challenge. It has continued to expose the fallacies and 
inconsistencies of the secular and evolutionary approach to science. 
They were helped in doing so by the fact that secular scholars have 
discovered themselves that their work is being haunted by 
secularism and postmodern fragmentation. The Christian community 
has also begun with a widespread effort to construct a new 
approach for scientific activity based upon the Biblical worldview, 
namely the stewardship approach. This approach still has the status 
of an unarrested social movement; it has not yet taken the form of a 
paradigm in the Kuhnian sense of the word. And finally, the Christian 
community has continued a sustained and concerted “evangelistic 
effort into the lost world” (the words of Moore (1982:85-86)), by 
expounding the stewardship approach and applying the 
transformational method. In this process, many Christian scholars 
have come to understand that it is one thing to say that they have 
the truth of the Word of God but altogether another thing to say that 
this truth can be fully understood. Based on this insight, they have 
relinquished the search for classical forms of foundationalism in 
favour of more modest, local and fallibilist forms of foundationalism. 
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